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INTRODUCTION
The law cannot ignore the power of science as a tool for
the finding of facts. Thus it must strive to develop a technique
that can both comprehend and appreciate. As the foundation
of both law and science is logic, no less can be demanded of
the bridge that unites them.'
With the current pace of technological developments, use of
scientific instruments and techniques is increasing in courtrooms
across the country.2 Since the 1970s, litigants have forced judges
and juries to consider a never-ending variety of scientific evi-
dence including polygraphs, 3 sound spectrometry,4 neutron acti-
I Lipton, The Results of Scientific Techniques as Evidence in Federal Courts:
Evolution of the Frye v. United States Standard in the Period 1969-1977, 8 EN=vT. L.
769, 783 (1978).
Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from
the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 Vni. L. R1v. 554, 555 (1983).
E.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1975); United States v.
Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1969); United States
v. Wilson, 361 F, Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973). See generally, Lipton, supra note 1, at 779-
83.
, Sound spectrograph is a tool used in the study of acoustics. Note, Different
Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye Test for Admitting
Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic Evidence In-
troduction, 5 REv. LIGATION, 327 (1986); e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Bailer, 519
F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Addison, 498
F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976);
Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1983).
See generally Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Voiceprint Evidence, 97 A.L.R.3d
294 (1980).
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vation analysis, 5 bite mark comparisons, 6 gunshot residue tests,7
and electrophoretic methods of genetic marker bloodstain typ-
ing.
8
Given this increased use of scientific evidence in the court-
room, courts must decide whether to apply the general standards
of logical relevancy or to develop special rules. 9 Normally, when
a court determines admissibility of expert testimony, it must
make two 10 preliminary determinations." The first determination
is whether the expert testimony will aid the trier of facts in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.' 2 The
second determination the court must make is whether the witness
is properly qualified to give the testimony sought. 3 But some
I For a definition of neutron activation analysis, see infra note 56. E.g., United
States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); State
v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547 (N.H. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Neutron Activation Analysis, 50
A.L.R.3d 117 (1973).
6 E.g., People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975); Patterson v. State,
509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1954). See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Tending to Identify
Accused By His Own Bite Marks, 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977); Butler, The Value of Bite
Mark Evidence, 1 INT'L J. FoRENsic DENnsTRm 23 (no. 1, 1973).
7 E.g., State v. Smith, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
8 This process dectects individual characteristics of bloodstains in order to deter-
mine a group of the population that could be the donors of the blood. Note, The
Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under
the Frye Standard, 11 OKA. Crrm U.L. REv. 773 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Admissibility
of Electrophoretic Methods]. E.g., California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987); People
v. Harbold, 464 N.E.2d 734 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). For other examples of scientific
evidence, see Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 CoruM. L. Rv. 1197, 1198 n.7, 1206 n.54 (1980);
Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evalua-
tion, 74 GEo. L.J. 1769, 1769 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The Frye Doctrine].
9 Lederer, Scientific Evidence-An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 517,
520 (1984).
,0 There are, of course, the initial relevancy requirements also. Relevancy is defined
.in FED. R. Evm. 401 ("[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.").
11 Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of
Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye Test, 19 Cans.
L. BuLL. 51, 51 (1983).
12 Id. See FED. R. Evw. 702 advisory committee's note ("Whether the situation
is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of
assisting the trier.").
" Graham, supra note 11, at 51. FED. R. Evm. 702 says that a witness may be
qualified as an expert by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education .... "
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commentators believe that when a court is faced with a "novel
form of expertise which has not yet received judicial sanction,
an initial inquiry is in order: [1]s this new technique or principle
sufficiently reliable 4 so that it will aid the jury in reaching
accurate results[?] ' 5 Others believe that no special rule should
be made for a novel form of evidence;1 6 they argue that the
traditional rules of expert testimony and relevancy are suffi-
cient.1
7
An additional requirement for the admission of scientific
evidence was introduced by the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit in Frye v. United States. 8 That court held
that the scientific content of an expert's testimony had to have
achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific com-
munity in order to be admissible. 19 The Frye test was accepted
almost universally by American courts in the 1970s.20 This test
has been "Fryed to a crisp," ' 2' however, by commentators and
recent courts. 22
" One commentator has noted:
The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific principle generally
depends on the following factors: (1) the validity of the underlying scientific
principle; (2) the validity of the technique or process that applies the
principle; (3) the condition of any instrumentation used in the process; (4)
adherence to proper procedures; (5) the qualifications of the person who
performs the test; and (6) the qualifications of the person who interprets
the results.
Graham, supra note 11, at 51.
" 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINsTEIN's EVMENCE 702[03], at 702-34, -35
(1988).
16 E.g., C. McCoiRMcK, HANDBooK oF Tim LAW OF EVMENCE § 203, at 491 (2d
ed. 1972); M. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissi-
bility, 67 IowA L. REv. 879, 880 (1982).
'7 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. For examples of the different
viewpoints that writers and courts have taken on the issue of admissibility of scientific
evidence, see M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 879 n.l.
1- 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
' Id. at 1014.
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 556-57 ("Indeed, at one point in the mid-1970's,
Frye seemed to be the controlling test in at least forty-five states." (citing Note, Changing
the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40
Omo ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979))).
21 Comment, Scientific Evidence-Admissibility Fryed to a Crisp, 21 S. TEx. L.J.
62 (1980).
2 E.g., Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198; State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 501-04 (Me.
1978). See generally E. CLAtY, McCo cK oN EVDENCE § 203, at 608 (3d ed. 1984);
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This Note emphasizes the need for a change in the standard
of admissibility of novel scientific evidence from the overly-
conservative Frye test to a rule that encourages admissibility of
relevant evidence and, thus, ultimately comes closer to aiding in
the discovery of the "truth" in litigation. This Note first dis-
cusses the problems associated with novel scientific evidence;2
next, this Note presents the Frye standard2 and alternative
standards25 for testing the admissibility of new scientific evi-
dence. Third, this Note questions whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence have helped courts to determine a standard of admis-
sibility for novel scientific evidence or whether those Rules merely
have muddied the admissibility waters. 26 Next, this Note dis-
cusses the current status of the law in Kentucky regarding sci-
entific evidence. 27 Finally, this Note proposes a standard for the
admission of scientific evidence that will eliminate many of the
problems that the Frye rule has created.2
I. SPECIAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY NOVEL SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
One writer has suggested that there are three basic reasons
why the "trend is unmistakably toward increased use of scientific
evidence at trial":29 the increased pace of technological change, 0
the breaking down of evidentiary barriers to the admission of
scientific proof,31 and the fact that lay jurors expect scientific
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAuAM, FEDERAL PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 87 (1978);
Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1247; M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 880; Note, The Frye
Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1790.
' See infra notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 74-175 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text.
2s See infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
- Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 554-55.
"' Id. at 555 ("This increase in the number of scientific techniques is understand-
able for it has been estimated that ninety percent of all the scientists who have ever
lived are alive today." (citing W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 83, at
53 (1983))).
11 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 556 (concurring with Dean McCormick that
"[t]he manifest destiny of evidence law is a progressive lowering of the barriers to
truth." (quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVDENCE 165 (1954))).
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proof.32 While the use of scientific evidence has undoubtedly
helped judges and juries to determine the truth in many cases,
this evidence has not been without problems.
Perhaps the greatest concern associated with the use of sci-
entific evidence at trial is the impact on the jury. As one court
noted, "scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture
of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen." 3 Op-
ponents of scientific evidence have argued that the jury may not
be able properly to assess forensic evidence, 34 and that, therefore,
special rules should be used to assure the proper use by the jury.
Other criticisms of scientific evidence include the high level
of error in forensic analysis, 35 resulting confusion of the jurors36
and excessive consumption of time.37 These fears have led courts
to reject admission of novel scientific evidence based on conser-
11 Id. at 559. Imwinkelried declared that this cause "may be the most important
catalyst." See Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1199-1200 for other factors contributing to the
rising use of scientific evidence at trial.
1 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Spectrographic
identification not admissible in criminal trials because not accepted by scientific com-
munity as a whole.).
34 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 560; see also United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d
1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Scientific or expert testimony particularly [carries the danger
of undue prejudice, confusing the issues or misleading the jury] because of its aura of
special reliability and trustworthiness."). Some writers stress the fact that "an expert
witness communicates with the jury on two levels: a message level and a paramessage
level." Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1773. The message is the actual words
and the paramessage is all the factors not part of the actual words. Id. at 1771. For
example, the "paramessage includes physical gestures made during the testimony, the
experience and background of the witness, and his or her general reputation or prestige."
Id. The fear of Frye doctrine advocates is that the jurors will not be able to handle the
message without significant negative impact from the paramessage. Id. at 1774. One
writer cited State v. Holt as an illustration of this problem, wherein the court stated
that the jury placed too much weight on a witness's opinion because of his "educational
background and his apparent prestige." Id. at 1773 (quoting State v. Holt, 246 N.E.2d
365, 368 (Ohio 1969)).
31 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 560. Imwinkelried points to studies, such as blood
alcohol and drug analysis studies, that indicate a high level of error. Id. at 560-61.
m6 3 J. WENsTmsN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, at 702-43. For example, the jury
may have difficulty comprehending the foundations of expert testimony. Note, Expert
Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 48 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 774, 777-81 n.21 (1980).
31 3 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BEROER, supra note 15, at 702-43. See, e.g., United States
v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 894-95 (N.D. Calif. 1976), affl'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1977).
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vative rules of admissibility such as the Frye test.' s But many
argue that such fears either are unsubstantiated or can be rem-
edied by less restrictive means than the current tests of admis-
sibility of novel scientific evidence.3 9 Courts and writers have
argued that juries properly can handle scientific evidence without
assigning too much weight to the evidence. 40 As one court stated,
"Judges and juries must be presumed to have average intelli-
gence at least, and no assumption to the contrary can be made
for the purpose of excluding otherwise admissible testimony.")41
And as one commentator wrote, "[T]here is little or no objective
support for the assertion [that jurors attach too much weight to
scientific evidence] and ... almost all the available data points
to the contrary conclusion. ' 42 Also, one commentator has noted
that, while there is a certain degree of inevitable error in scien-
tific evidence, 43 "the error in eyewitness testimony is at least as
frequent and less controllable than error in scientific testi-
mony."44
No doubt, there are numerous problems associated with
scientific evidence. However, arguably, there are less restrictive
means of curing or mitigating those problems than rejection of
the evidence. "Arguably, cross-examination, voir dire, limiting
instructions, or opposing expert [sic] can reduce the chance that
jurors will have problems understanding the message component
of expert testimony.1 4. One writer suggests five safeguards that
11 See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); Addison,
498 F.2d 741; Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978).
11 See, e.g., infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
4 Shanks v. State, 45 A.2d 85, 90 (Md. 1945); Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 566-
71; Comment, supra note 21, at 69.
41 Shanks, 45 A.2d at 90.
42 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 566. Imwinkelried points to the Chicago Jury
Project as support for this proposition. The Chicago Jury Project is a study funded by
the Ford Foundation and conducted by the University of Chicago Law School that
examined the dynamics of criminal jury trials. Id. at 566 n.83. This "most intensive
study ever conducted on the ability and behavior of American jurors," id. at 567, led
to two important conclusions set forth in Professors Kalven and Zeisel's work, The
American Jury: (1) The jury understands the facts and "get[s] the case straight," Id.
(quoting H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, Tra AmmucAN Juny 149 (1966)); and (2) the verdict
of the jury "moves with the weight and direction of the evidence," id. (quoting H.
KALvEN & H. ZEIsEL, at 149).
41 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
" Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 565.
41 Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1786 (footnotes omitted).
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may be used at trial to aid jurors in understanding and dealing
with scientific evidence.46 First, the court can appoint impartial
experts to educate the jury in the form of a lecture or instruc-
tional guidance.47 Second, the court can allow the jurors to ask
questions of the expert witness during the trial.'4 The third
proposed technique is to permit jurors to take notes while an
expert is testifying.49 This safeguard can give jurors "a way of
checking details, allow[ing] them to better organize information,
and assist[ing] in their decision making." 50 Fourth, courts can
give periodic summaries of expert testimony to foster juror
knowledge.5 1 A fifth procedure a court can employ is to give
reading material to jurors before the trial to help familiarize
them with the scientific evidence they will observe at trial.52
"[Tihis procedure [can] encourage juror involvement ... and
juror knowledge.
' 53
An additional way to rebut the difficult aspects of admitting
scientific evidence is to emphasize its positive attributes and
"Id. at 1787-90.
" Id. at 1787. The author points out that Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows a
court to bring in an expert. The author says that the independent expert could, before
the trial, offer guidance on the fundamentals of the scientific testimony to be presented
at trial. "Alternatively or additionally, the court could have the independent expert
summarize the import of the novel scientific testimony periodically during the trial." Id.
But some would argue that even these "independent" experts could acquire "an aura
of infallibility." Id. at n.129.
," Id. at 1788. See id. at n.130 for a list of courts allowing this technique. This
technique could "increase juror knowledge by permitting jurors to ask for clarification
of confusing or obscure aspects of the testimony," id. at 1788, and "allow them to take
a more active role in the communication of the testimony .. . ." Id. However, opponents
say that such a technique is not consistent with the adversary system because interruption
of a presentation may affect the impact of the information or create unfair consideration
of the evidence. Id. at n.131.
4 Id. at 1788-89. See id. at n.133 for jurisdictions allowing this procedure. The
author points to studies showing that juror notetaking aids in factfinding and increases
juror interest. Id. at 1788 & nn.135-36.
" Id. at 1789 (quoting Silas, Juror Notes, 72 A.B.A.J. 20, 21 (1986)). Critics
could argue that notetaking could "disrupt the factfinding process by reducing concen-
tration on oral testimony and increasing the power of the written word. In a sense, the
most efficient notetaker could control the deliberations." Id. at n.138.
51 Id. at 1789. Opponents of this procedure might argue that periodic summations
might invade the jury's fact-finding responsibilities if the expert tells the jury what it
should believe. Id. at n.140.
52 Id. at 1789.
11 Id. But one might argue that this procedure could "detract from the impact of
equally significant oral testimony." Id. at n.144.
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conclude that those attributes outweigh the unfavorable ones.
Scientific techniques can be utilized to reconstruct important
evidence in both civil and criminal cases.5 4 For example, scientific
evidence can help to identify a criminal defendant with a material
piece of evidence. United States v. Stife55 provides a useful
illustration. That case dealt with the admission of neutron acti-
vation analysis results.5 6 The defendant, Orville Stifel, was in-
dicted for murdering a man by sending a bomb to him through
the mail. The explosion occurred when the decedent opened the
package containing the bomb.57 The Government's expert witness
testified regarding his study of fragments of the bomb package
via neutron activation analysis. 8 He testified that, by the use of
neutron activation analysis, he could identify the fragments of
the bomb as being from the same manufacturer and same batches
of cardboard, tape, a metal top, and a paper gummed label as
taken from the defendant's place of employment.5 9 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the admission of
that testimony was not reversible error 0 The court said that
neutron activation analysis had met the Frye "general accep-
tance" test.
61
In short, scientific evidence can be crucial to the proof of a
case or to a defendant's exculpation. In light of the potential
significance of scientific eviderice, it is easy to understand the
importance of developing a functional and flexible standard for
the admission of novel scientific evidence. As early as 1940,
Professor Wigmore understood the import of scientific evidence:
In earlier practice, the marks attending a criminal act ... were
limited chiefly to circumstances observable by the naked
, Comment, supra note 21, at 72.
11 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971), vacated, 594 F.
Supp. 1525 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (failure of prosecution to divulge material, exculpatory
evidence).
,6 "Neutron activation analysis is a Anethod of identilying the compositibn of small
particles by bombarding them with nuclear particles, usually neutrons, produced by a
nuclear reactor." M. McCormick, supra note 16, at § 90 n.69 (citing A. MoENssENs &
F. INBAU, SCIENTIIc EVIDENCE IN CRnIINA. CAsEs § 9.04 (2d ed. 1978)).
57 Stifel, 433 F.2d at 431.
11 Id. at 434.
59 Id.
61 Id. at 438.
6, Id. at 441.
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eye .... But by the use of the microscope, the photographic
enlargement of microscopic data, the employment of chemical
agents, and the invocation of specialists' knowledge in many
branches of science ... data are now perceivable and obtain-
able which were formerly beyond imagination.62
II. Tim STANDARDS FOR ADMIssIrBLITY
A proponent of scientific evidence must prove the reliability
of that evidence.63 Three factors determine the reliability of
scientific evidence: "(1) the validity64 of the underlying principle,
(2) the validity of the technique applying that principle, and (3)
the proper application of the technique on a particular occa-
sion." ' 65 The first two factors are only important with a new
scientific technique;6 a court can remove from the proponent
the burden of producing evidence on these factors by taking
judicial notice67 of a principle and technique once it is estab-
lished. 6 For example, courts have taken judicial notice of radar
detectors, intoxication tests, and fingerprints.6 9
It is rare for a court to take judicial notice of a scientific
technique the first time it is offered at trial; therefore, the
validity of novel scientific evidence normally is proved through
expert testimony.70 Today when a court is faced with determining
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, it first must decide
62 Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U.
ILL. L.F. 1, 2 (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE 400 (3d ed. 1940)).
63 Note, Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods, supra note 8, at 778.
6' Validity and reliability are not synonymous. "'Validity' refers to the ability of
a test procedure to measure what it is supposed to measure-its accuracy. 'Reliability'
refers to whether the same results are obtained in each instance in which the test is
performed-its consistency. Validity includes reliability, but the converse is not neces-
sarily true." Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1201 n.20.
Id. at 1200-01 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1202.
A scientific principle may be legislatively recognized as well. Id. at 1203. See,
e.g., Onzo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4511.091 (Baldwin 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-198
(1974).
Id. at 1202-03.
69 Id. at 1203. See, e.g., State v. Tomanelli, 216 A.2d 625, 628-30 (Conn. 1966)
(radar); State v. Miller, 165 A.2d 829, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (intoxication
test); Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1936) (fingerprints).
10 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1203.
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upon a proper standard to use. Currently, the two most com-
monly used standards are the Frye71 standard and the relevancy72
standard .
73
A. The Frye Standard
The most famous and commonly used74 standard for the
admissibility of innovative scientific evidence was developed in
1923 in Frye v. United States.75 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in rejecting evidence obtained
from the use of a systolic blood pressure deception test (a
predecessor to the polygraph),'76 created a new standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in the twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
77
In its two-page opinion, 7 the Frye court in effect created an
independent requirement, in addition to the prerequisites of rel-
evancy and helpfulness to the trier of fact. The court added that
for scientific evidence to be admissible the principle or technique
also must have achieved general acceptance in the relevant sci-
entific community. 79 While the Frye test was adopted without
' See infra notes 74-175 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
71 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1203.
74 See Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer
on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 261, 264
(1981-82).
- 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
76 Id. at 1013-14.
- Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
11 "[T]he Frye court neither cited authority nor offered an explanation for adopting
the general acceptance standard." Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1205.
7, Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
[VoL. 77
FIT TO BE FRYED
much discussion by numerous courts,80 and became "not only
the majority view . .. [but] the almost universal view," ' 81 the
test recently has been vigorously criticized, changed, and some-
times rejected.8
2
Advocates of the Frye "general acceptance" standard argue
that a separate requirement for the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence is necessary for several reasons. First, the general
acceptance test assures that "a minimal reserve of experts exists
who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determi-
nation in a particular case." 8 3 Second, the standard requires the
approval by the "scientific community," which assures that
those best qualified resolve the validity of scientific evidence.84
Third, the standard "may well promote a degree of uniformity
of decision" 85 by assuring that judges rest their decisions of the
admissibility of a novel technique on general agreement among
scientists. 86 The fourth argument for the Frye test suggests that
it protects the jury from the "unwarranted impact caused by the
misleading aura of certainty that frequently surrounds new dis-
coveries." 8 7 Fifth, the standard does not require lengthy hearings
on the validity of novel forms of scientific evidence.8 8 Sixth, if
an appellate court accepted a scientific technique, it could create
binding precedent so long as the scientific community still "gen-
erally accepted" the technique. 89
10 M. McCormick, supra note 16; see also Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1206 ("Un-
fortunately in most instances judicial adoption of the general acceptance standard has
not been accompanied by a supporting rationale.").
" Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 556.
12 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 883. See infra notes 105-59 & 107-20 and
accompanying text.
" United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding inadmis-
sible spectrographic voice identification which was not generally accepted).
" M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 883 (citing Addison, 498 F.2d at 744).
" People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 (1976)
(reversing a conviction due to error in admitting spectrographic voice identification).
6 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 883.
' Id.
s Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1207.
" M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 883. See Note, The Admissibility of Electro-
phoretic Methods, supra note 8, at 779 ("The Frye standard also insures that the
admissibility question is not reexamined in each subsequent case in which the technique
is introduced into evidence.").
1988-89]
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Despite its commendable attributes in theory, the Frye doc-
trine has received much criticism by courts and commentators.
Most of the important criticisms can be grouped into one of five
major points. First, courts have been inconsistent in character-
izing proof as scientific evidence that must meet the Frye test.9°
Second, courts have had difficulty in defining the relevant sci-
entific field. 91 One writer noted, "Many scientific techniques do
not fall within the domain of a single academic discipline or
professional field. Consequently, selecting the proper field may
prove troublesome. More importantly, selection of the appro-
priate field may be dispositive." 92 Third, the phrase "general
acceptance" 93 makes the test ambiguous 94 and "remarkably
90 Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 264-65; see also State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80,
85 (Iowa 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, sub nom. Hall v. Iowa, 450 U.S. 927 (1981)
("Despite its apparent simplicity, distinguishing 'scientific' evidence from other areas of
expert testimony is a difficult determination in many instances." (citing C. McCotcK,
supra note 16, § 203, at 490)); Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1219 ("As McCormick has
commented, the application of the Frye test is 'highly selective.' (citing C. McCoIW]cK,
supra note 16, at 490)). Indeed, the selective application of the general acceptance
standard is one of its most notable features-inconsistencies in application abound. Part
of the problem may lie in defining what types of evidence should be classified as
'scientific evidence' and thus subject to the Frye test."); Note, United States v. Downing:
Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 839, 841 (1986)
("Other difficulties ... include inconsistency among courts in determining when to
apply the test .... ).
9' Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 265. ("Should forensic science itself be treated
as a scientific field?" Id.); see also Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 85 ('Acceptance in the
scientific community' is a nebulous concept; as it has been said, 'court records are full
of the conflicting opinions of doctors, engineers and accountants, to name just a few
of the legions of expert witnesses,' (citing United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971)) .. ., and '[i]n testing for admissibility of
a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern may be,
the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists responsibility for determining the
reliability of that evidence."' (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979))); Note, supra note 90, at 841 ("Other
difficulties ... include ... judicial rather than scientific opinion as a basis for finding
general acceptance .... ).
92 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1208 (footnotes omitted).
93 See generally id. at 1215-19 ("Three methods of proof [used to show acceptance
in the relevant community] have been recognized by the courts: (1) expert testimony, (2)
scientific and legal writing, and (3) judicial opinions." Id. at 1215).
94 Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 265; see also Comment, supra note 21, at 65
("But perhaps, the one criticism that is the most noted is that there is no definite or
consistent criteria to determine what is general acceptance."); Note, supra note 90, at
840-41 ("Difficulties in defining its terms have permitted courts to manipulate its
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vague." ' 95 As one commentator posed the problem, "[The courts
have not been consistent in determining whether the appropriate
subject of the 'general acceptance' test is the technique, the
scientific premises underlying the technique, or the ability of the
technique's practitioner." 96 Also, the decisions have not specified
what percentage" of the people in the relevant scientific commu-
nity must have accepted the technique, 97 a determination which
would promote consistency in results. The fourth, and "most
compelling," ' 98 criticism of the Frye doctrine is that it results in
a deprivation of reliable and often outcome-determinative evi-
dence. 99 "The test ensures that the courts will constantly lag
behind the advances of science while the courts wait for novel
scientific techniques to win 'general acceptance." ' 100 Professor
Charles McCormick agreed that the "general acceptance" test
erected too high a hurdle: "General scientific acceptance is a
proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
it is not a suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence."' 0 1 A fifth criticism is that the Frye test, "by focusing
parameters, subverting the uniformity of decision paradigm for which Frye has been
hailed." (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, at 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing
testimony from an expert in perception and memory, concerning eyewitness reliability))).
91 22 C. WsofroT & K. GRuxa, supra note 22, § 5168, at 87.
9 Note, supra note 36, at 779-80 (1979-80) (footnotes omitted).
91 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1210-11.
" Note, Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods, supra note 8, at 780.
" See Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 265; see also Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 84 ("Such
a rule imposes a standard for admissibility not required of other areas of expert
testimony ..... " (citing C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 203, at 488-89)); Giannelli,
supra note 8, at 1224 ("[T]he critical issue is whether other approaches can better achieve
the Frye objective of 'prevent[ing] ... the introduction into evidence of specious and
unfounded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such principles."' (quoting
Strong, supra note 62, at 1, 14)); Note, Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods, supra
note 8, at 780 ("The most compelling criticism, however, is that the Frye standard
results in the exclusion of valuable scientific evidence while the courts wait for the
techniques to gain general acceptance." (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 265));
Note, supra note 90, at 841 ("Finally, Frye has been criticized for impeding the search
for truth by precluding relevant evidence." (citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236-37)); cf.
Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1224 ("The critics who argue that the Frye standard is too
conservative are saying, in effect, that the general acceptance standard works too well-
it excludes much that is reliable along with that which is unreliable. Interestingly, many
commentators have overlooked instances in which Frye does not work.").
100 Imwinkelried, supra note 68, at 265.
101 E. CLEARY, supra note 22, § 203, at 608; see also 3 D. LoisELL & C. MUtaR,
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attention on the general acceptance issue, . . . obscures critical
problems in the use of a particular technique."' 1  For example,
one writer illustrates this criticism with cases addressing the
admissibility of neutron activation analysis.103 The commentator
notes that concentrating on the general acceptance of neutron
activation analysis "conceal[sj the iost critical aspect of NAA
[neutron activation analysis]-whether, as interpreted, the results
of the test ate relevant to the issues in dispute."0 4
Because of these and other criticisms revealing the inadequa-
cies of the Frye test, several courts, state and federal, have
ignored, modified, or rejected the test.105 This departure from
the conservative "general acceptance" test has been based on
three theories: (1) statutory construction; (2) constitutional in-
ierpretation; and (3) changing common-law rules.I°6
One method by which courts have strayed from the "general
acceptance" test is via statutory construction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 10 7 This method is discussed separately later
in this Note. 08 A second way of abolishing the Frye test is by
challenging its validity on constitutional grounds. In State v.
Dorsey,'09 a New Mexico court held that a criminal defendant
had a right to introduce the results of a polygraph examination
because of the due process clause of the Constitution."0 In State
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382, at 643-44 (1979) ("This standard [general acceptance] .... is
better suited to describe conditions under which judicial notice may be taken of scientific
principles (as a means of dispensing with formal proof on foundational matters) than
to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
101 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1226. See generally id. at 1226-28.
103 Id. at 1226.
104 Id.
oI See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 347-61 (spectrographic evidence).
"0 Imwinkelfied, supra note 74, at 265-67.
1w Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (codified at 28 U.S.C. App. A (1976)) [hereinafter FED. R.
Evm.].
' See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
532 P.2d 912 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975).
11 Id. at 914-15; see Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1231. The Court of Appeals in
Dorsey said that the testimony of the polygraph examiner was crucial because it went
both to the question of intent and the issue of provocation. Dorsey, 532 P.2d at 915.
The court relied on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) and quoted therefrom:
'The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations'; 'few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."' Dorsey,
532 P.2d at 914.
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v. Sims,"' an Ohio court said that, based on the compulsory
process guarantee, the defendant has an implied right to present
polygraph evidence.'
2
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held in Rock v.
Arkansas 3 that a "per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testi-
mony infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendft to
testify on his or her own behalf."11 4 In Rock, the defendant,
charged with manslaughter for shooting her husband, underwent
hypnosis to help her remember the details of the shooting. 15
The trial court limited the defendant's testimony at trial to
"matters remembered and stated to the examiner prior to being
placed under hypnosis.""16 The defendant was convicted and the
Arkansas Supreme Court denied defendant's claim that her con-
stitutional rights were violated." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court dis-
agreed, holding that a state cannot use a rule that allows a
witness to testify, "but arbitrarily excludes material portions of
his testimony.""" The Court noted that the inaccuracies that
hypnosis introduces could be diminished by the use of procedural
safeguards." 9 The Court said that
Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an
arbitrary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of
clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all post-
hypnosis recollections. The State would be well within its pow-
ers if it established guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation
of posthypnosis testimony and it may be able to show that
testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified. But it has not shown that hypnotically enhanced
testimony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the
traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable
" 369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. 1977).
112 Id. at 33-47; see Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1230-31. For other possible consti-
tutional limits of the Frye test, see M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 902-04.
1:3 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
11 Id. at 2714-15.
" Id. at 2706.
"6 Id. at 2707.
227 Id. at 2707-08.
M' Id. at 2711.
"9 Id. at 2714 (noting the possible safeguards of taping interrogations, cross-




a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which
she is on trial.
1 20
The third way courts have departed from Frye is by changing
common law rules. One of the first cases to stray from the Frye
test by altering common law rules was Coppolino v. State in
1969.121 The court upheld a trial court's ruling that evidence of
a scientific technique was admissible despite rejection by several
defense expert witnesses. The court based its decision on the
theory that "the trial judge enjoys wide discretion in areas
concerning the admission of evidence."' Soon thereafter many
more courts began re-evaluating the Frye standard.'2
Although approximately forty-five states followed the Frye
standard at one point in the mid-1970s, 124 a number of state
courts began to modify or reject the "general acceptance" test
after Coppolino was decided. 125 Some courts decided that the
Frye test affected the weight, and not the admissibility, of expert
testimony dealing with scientific evidence. 126 Other courts "en-
gage[d] in an independent consideration of the scientific validity
of the new technique."' 127 Several other courts held that the Frye
standard required a showing of the reliability of the principle or
technique.12 Still other courts have modified Frye by narrowly
12 Id.
121 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); see Imwinkelried, supra note 74, at 265 ("The
first slippage away from Frye occurred ... in Coppolino v. State .....
122 Coppolino, 223 So. 2d at 70.
"2 See M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 890 ("The case [Coppolino] became a
rallying point for those who opposed the Frye standard.").
,14 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 557.
"- See M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 892-95, 897-902.
126 See id. at 892 (citing People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Ct. App. 1975)
(allowing bitemark evidence); Jenkins v. State, 274 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(allowing palmprints)).
W" Note, supra note 4, at 347 (citing D'Arc v. D'Arc, 385 A.2d 278, 281 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (determining validity, reliability, and veracity of spectrographic
evidence); People v. Bien, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343, 346-47 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (allowing competent
9xperts to establish reliability of spectrographs); People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365,
367 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (applying twofold test of reliability and scientific acceptance to
spectrographic evidence)).
' M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 892 (citing Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474,
479 (Alaska 1970) (polygraph evidence); Caldwell v. State, 594 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1980) (expert concerning eyewitness testimony); People v. Bynum, 556 P.2d 469,
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defining the "relevant scientific community." 129 For example, in
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 130 the court limited the scientific com-
munity to "those who would be expected to be familiar with its
use."'' Another group of courts avoided this Frye dilemma by
ignoring it. 12
Federal courts also have found ways to modify the Frye
standard in order to admit reliable scientific evidence. 133 For
example, in United States v. Stifel, 34 the Federal Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, while referring to Frye, held that the
criticisms of the defendant's expert witnesses went to the weight
of the evidence, not to its admissibility.1 3- Two 1975 federal
courts of appeals' decisions, United States v. Franks36 and United
States v. Bailer,137 added to this wave of Frye doctrine modifi-
cation. In Franks, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that "general acceptance ... [is] nearly synonymous with
reliability. If a scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently ac-
curate, courts may also deem it 'generally accepted.' ' 138 In Bailer,
470 (Colo. 1976) (test using sodium amytal); State v. Saia, 372 A.2d 144, 147 (Conn.
1975) (polygraph evidence); State v. Chambers, 239 S.E.2d 324, 325-27 (Ga. 1977)
(polygraph evidence)); see also State v. Washington, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (Kan. 1981)
(multisystem method of blood analysis).
I" Note, supra note 4, at 347 (citing Hodo v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547,
553 (Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Mass. 1975); Bien,
453 N.Y.S.2d at 347; People v. Rogers, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 237 (App. Div. 1976)).
23O 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975).
Id. at 677; see also Hodo, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
" M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 894 (citing People v. LaSumba, 414 N.E.2d
1318, 1321-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 849 (1981) (applying a relevancy
test to allow esterace D tests on blood stains); State v. Satterfield, 592 P.2d 135, 140
(Kan. App. Ct. 1979) (allowing a blood spattering analysis); State v. Beachman, 616
P.2d 337, 339 (Mont. 1980) (applying expert testimony standard to reject polygraph
evidence)).
M Federal courts relying on the Federal Rules of Evidence to modify or reject the
Frye test are discussed later in this Note. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying
text.
,4 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (expert testimony
regarding neutron activation analysis of bomb package fragments). For additional dis-
cussion of this case, see supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
5Stifel, 433 F.2d at 438.
i' 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (expert testimony
regarding voice prints).
13 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (expert testimony
concerning spectrographic evidence).
3 Franks, 511 F.2d at 33 n.12.
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the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial
court's admission of spectrographic 39 results, saying, "[lit is
better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner
as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by
cross-examination and refutation."' 4 More recently, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit altered the applicable standard
of admissibility of scientific evidence by requiring "substantial
acceptance in the relevant discipline.' ' 41 As one commentator
noted, "As applied, distinguished, or ignored in these federal
and state cases, the Frye standard has undergone substantial
implicit modification."' 142
While some courts have found it sufficient to modify the
Frye doctrine, others have gone the extra step and rejected it.
Wisconsin was the first state to reject the Frye doctrine. 43 In
Watson v. State,'44 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that sci-
entific opinion opposing a technique merely framed a credibility
issue for the jury to decide. 45 In 1978 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine followed suit in State v. Williams.'4 The Maine
court adopted a rule which allowed the judge "a latitude, which
the Frye rule denies, to hold admissible ... proffered evidence
involving newly ascertained, or applied, scientific principles which
have not yet achieved general acceptance ... if a showing has
been made which satisfies the Justice that the proffered evidence
is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant."' 147 Several other state
court cases have rejected the Frye standard of "general accep-
tance" as well.'" For example, in 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court
"I See supra note 4 for a definition and a list of cases concerning spectrographic
evidence.
140 Bailer, 519 F.2d at 466.
'1' United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 49 (4th Cir. 1984). The court recognized
this standard as "less stringent" than the Frye test. Id. at n.2.
141 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 894.
141 Id. at 897 ("The earliest rejection of the Frye standard occurred in Watson v.
State .... ).
- 219 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. 1974).
141 Id. at 403; M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 897.
146 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
"47 Id. at 504.
I" See Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
910 (1982), appeal after remand 492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985) (using relevance and reliability
to allow admission of sperm testing in rape case); Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395
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rejected the Frye test saying that the court would not "engage
in scientific nose-counting for the purpose of deciding whether
evidence based on newly ascertained or applied scientific prin-
ciples is admissible.'
'149
Several federal courts also have rejected the Frye test.'50 In
United States v. Williams,'' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied a traditional relevancy approach in admitting
spectrographic evidence.' 52 The court discussed only the reliabil-
ity of the evidence and the tendency to mislead, since the pro-
(Ga. 1982) (determination of whether a truth-serum had "reached a scientific stage of
verifiable certainty"); Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (if reliability of bloodstain analysis can be
otherwise established, Frye does not apply); Brown v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 758,
760 (Ky. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983) (allowing any relevant testimony of
a qualified expert to be admitted); State v. Catarese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980-82 (La. 1979)
(excluding polygraph evidence because its probative value was outweighed by its possi-
bility for misuse); People v. Young, 308 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981),
remanded, 340 N.W.2d 805 (Mich.), rev'd, 391 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1983) (allowing
admission of test comparing blood samples where defendant could offer no evidence to
dispute the expert's reliance on the test); People v. Daniels, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (Sup.
Ct. 1979) (holding that decision to admit polygraph evidence should be based on same
criteria as other evidence); State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1101-02 (Or. Ct. App.
1981), aff'd, 638 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1982) (court allowed admission of microscopic com-
parison of hair samples because the test was reliable); Utah ex rel. Phillips v. Jackson,
615 P.2d 1228, 1236-38 (Utah 1980) (court refused admission of blood test in a paternity
suit since proponent did not provide a sufficient foundation and therefore did not
establish reliability); see also M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 895 ("New Mexico and
Wyoming decisions reach the same result without expressly rejecting Frye." (citing State
v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (N.M. 1975) (requiring establishment of operator's expertise
and test's reliability in order to admit polygraph evidence); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d
445, 458-59 (Wyo. 1977) (court found that if polygraph evidence "will assist the trier of
fact" it should be admitted))).
M, State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983) (refusing to allow admission
of spectrographic evidence based upon criteria set forth in the FED. R. EvID.).
I5 See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104 (1987) (allowing admission of sperm test despite lack of
"general acceptance" because court found test to be reliable); United States v. Sample,
378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (allowing admission of voice print because it was
relevant evidence, expert was qualified, and defendant failed to offer any evidence
challenging test's reliability); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-99 (1983)
(psychiatric testimony addressing future dangerousness of defendant was admissible
despite lack of "general acceptance" since it was relevant and its weight could be left
to the factfinder); cf. Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, 825 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1476 (1988) (expert testimony regarding cause of leukemia held
admissible despite lack of "general acceptance" since the expert relied upon accepted
"methods" in reaching his conclusion) (emphasis in original).
251 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
252 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 896.
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bativeness and materiality factors were not disputed. 5 3 The
opinion listed five indicators of reliability: "(1) potential rate of
error in use of the technique, (2) existence and maintenance of
standards among its users, (3) care with which the technique was
employed in the case, (4) analogy of the technique to others
whose results are admissible, and (5) presence of safeguards in
the characteristics of the technique.'
15 4
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected the Frye test in United States v. Downing.1
5
That court instead adopted a reliability approach which "occu-
pies the middle ground between the more liberal and conservative
approaches to the admission of novel scientific evidence.'
' 56 It
held that three factors should be considered when determining
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
(1) the soundness and reliability of the process or technique
used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admit-
ting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the
jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the scientific
research or test result to be presented and particular disputed
factual issues in the case.1
7
The court also listed several factors to be considered in deter-
mining the reliability of a scientific technique, including the
"novelty" of the technique, whether there is specialized literature
on the technique, the qualifications and professional stature of
the witnesses, the non-judicial uses of the technique, the fre-
quency of error, and expert testimony offered in earlier cases
regarding the procedure.15 8 This approach did allow for a deter-
mination of the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific
community as well, but did not require it.1 9
153 Id.
114 Id. (citing Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-99).
" 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Note, supra note 90, at 844 ("Down-
ing.., marks the first time that a federal court has unequivocally rejected Frye in favor
of a reliability approach.").
,"I Note, supra note 90, at 839.
'57 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
"I Id. at 1238-39; see also Note, supra note 90, at 846.
,,9 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238.
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Although there is indeed a "discernible trend toward an
expansive admissibility standard,"' 160 many state and federal courts
have refused to abandon the Frye doctrine. As mentioned above,
nearly all state courts followed Frye at one time.1 6' The Supreme
Court of California adamantly defended Frye in 1976 in People
v. Kelly. 62 It found that "there is ample justification for the
exercise of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of
evidence developed by new scientific techniques."'' 63 The court
justified using the Frye test because it "may well promote a
degree of uniformity of decision,"' 64 and because the "existence
of 'misleading aura of certainty ... often envelops a new sci-
entific procedure, obscuring its currently experimental na-
ture.""11 65 The Kelly court, deciding whether to admit
spectrographic evidence, noted that "[e]xercise of restraint is
especially warranted when the identification technique is offered
to identify the perpetrator of a crime. ' '166 The Maryland Court
of Appeals relied on Kelly when it accepted the Frye test in Reed
v. State. 67 The Reed court also found that spectrographic evi-
dence had been erroneously admitted at the trial level. 68 It noted,
If a judge or jurors [sic] have no foundation, either in their
experience or in the accepted principles of scientists, on which
they might base an informed judgment, they will be left to
fdllow their fancy. Thus, courts should be properly reluctant
to resolve the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to
experiment but for science to do so. ''169
160 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 904.
62 For a list of states using the "general acceptance" standard see Reed v. State,
391 A.2d 364 at 368 (Md. 1978); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
M 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
162 Id. at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
16 Id. at 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
261 Id. at 1245, 130 Cal. R1ltr. at 149 (quoting Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d
382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966)).
I" Id. The court stated that the general acceptance of a technique must be looked
at carefully especially when identification of the perpetrator of a crime is based upon
an opinion made using an unproven scientific technique (quoting People v. Law, 114
Cal. Rptr. 708, 719 (1974)).
'- 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978) (voice prints inadmissible as evidence identifying
defendant as speaker of telephone calls to victim); see also M. McCormick, supra note
16, at 884.
I6 Reed, 391 A.2d at 377.
169 Id. at 371 (quoting State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1968), aff'd, 264 A.2d 209 (N.J. 1970)) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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Numerous federal courts also have applied the "general ac-
ceptance" test. 70 In one of the most frequently cited cases
favoring the Frye standard, United States v. Addison, 7' the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that the general acceptance requirement "assures that
those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific
method will have the determinative voice '1 2 and "assur[es] that
a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine
the validity of a scientific determination." 17 3 The court also
noted the importance of the ability to produce expert witnesses
to rebut scientific evidence, as such evidence sometimes "as-
sume[s] a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen. "1
74
For whatever reason-statutory, constitutional, or common
law-courts are re-evaluating the use of the Frye standard of




An alternative to the Frye test that is used extensively by the
courts is the "relevancy" approach. 176 The relevancy standard
1O United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 71 (1987); United States v.
Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.
1979); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown,
557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975);
Addison, 498 F.2d 741; United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 849 (1973); United
States v. Clifford, 543 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 704 F.2d
86 (3d Cir. 1983).
M 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In Id. at 743-44.
'7 Id. at 744. The court stated that since scientific evidence may sometimes "assume
a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen, the ability to produce
rebuttal experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular
technique, may prove to be essential." Id.
174 Id.
17 See M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 904 ("A discernible trend toward an
expansive admissibility standard plainly exists."); Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1231 ("[I]t
is likely that more courts will consider jettisoning the Frye standard.").
176 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1203. For a list of cases following this approach see
id. at n.276.
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treats novel scientific evidence the same as other evidence-
admissible if relevant, not outweighed by undue prejudice, not
misleading to the jury, and not requiring an undue consumption
of time. 177 Professor Charles McCormick, the individual most
often associated with the relevancy approach, 178 discussed it as
such:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for tak-
ing judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclu-
sions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should
be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Par-
ticularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue con-
sumption of time. If the courts used this approach, instead of
repeating a supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not
elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of
utilizing the results of scientific advances.
7 9
Some have argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence codify this
relevancy approach.8 0
Other approaches have been advocated by numerous writers
and courts.s'8 One alternative is the establishment of an expert
tribunal to decide the validity and reliability of a novel scientific
development. 8 2 Proponents of this expert tribunal approach as-
sert that an expert tribunal is highly qualified, neutral, and
unaffected by the procedural requirements of a trial. 83 The
I" Id. at 1204.
17 Id. at 1203, 1233-35.
'' C. MCCOR)ECK, supra note 16, § 203, at 491 (footnotes omitted).
110 Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1204 n.39. Pertinent Federal Rules of Evidence are
discussed infra notes 211-27 and accompanying text.
"I For a list of some approaches taken, see M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 899
n.l.
Id. at 906.
" Id. "The tribunal could become the forum for taking a survey of scientific
opinion. The search for truth would not be affected by the procedural inhibitions inherent
in an adversary trial. Presumably, the decision would be made by neutral parties most
qualified to make it." Id. "[E]valuation would be conducted by scientists without a




tribunal also may propose new areas of research.84 Critics of
this approach argue that it is inconclusive and time-consuming. 5
Consequently, the proposal never has been adopted. 8 '
One writer has proposed that a better alternative to the Frye
standard would be an adjustment of the burden of proof.18 7 The
writer suggests that while civil litigants and criminal defendants
should establish the validity of new scientific evidence by a
preponderance of the evidence, the prosecution should be forced
to prove its validity beyond a reasonable doubt.'88 While this
approach "combine[s] the advantages of traditional analysis with
emphasis on the need for special care in admitting novel scientific
evidence,"'18 9 critics have labelled it "inappropriate and unwork-
able.,, 190
One commentator suggests that the relevancy test is best, as
long as certain modifications in the judicial system are made.' 9'
He suggests several vehicles for "enhanc[ing] juror knowledge
and involvement,"'' 92 such as allowing jurors to take notes during
testimony and allowing jurors to ask questions of expert wit-
nesses during the trial. 93
Another alternative, the "reliability" approach, would allow
admission of a new scientific technique only when its reliability
is sufficiently established. 94 Under this approach, any unrelia-
"' Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1232. "A technique that has demonstrated potential
but has not yet been sufficiently validated would not receive an unqualified vdto, which
might stifle future development and research." Id.
ISS M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 906.
" Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1232.
"7 See id. at 1245-50.
Id. at 1248.
I" M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 908 (citing Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1245-
50).
190 Note, supra note 4, at 370. It was so labeled because it would be time consuming,
would eliminate the need for a jury, and it would neither give the judge any factors to
consider in deciding whether the burden of proof has been met nor present the proponent
of the evidence with any guide as to how to prepare and argue the reliability issue. Id.
at 370-71.
"I Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1786-90; see supra notes 45-53 and
accompanying text.
"92 Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1787.
"I' Id. at 1788.
194 Note, supra note 90, at 842 (citing Utah ex rel. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d
1228, 1234-35 (Utah-1980); State v. Temple, 273 S.E.2d 273, 280 (N.C. 1981); State v.
Powell, 140 S.E.2d 705, 706 (N.C. 1965)).
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bility or lack of acceptance of a technique goes to its weight
and not its admissibility. 19
One writer proposes a three-prong test as a standard for
admissibility of scientific evidence:
First, a proper foundation must be established by showing: 1)
qualified expert testimony concerning the validity of the prin-
ciple upon which the device or method is based; 2) expert
testimony demonstrating the ability of the device to reflect that
principle; and 3) proper functioning of the device. Second, the
probative value of the evidence is to be proved by a showing
of logical relevancy and reasonable reliability of the technology
in question. Third, important policy factors of the court should
be recognized and weighed against the probative value of the
evidence. 96
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Rules of Evidence, effec-
tive July 1, 1975, have been used as a way to reject the Frye
test. 197 But it is unsettled whether the Rules abolish the Frye test,
or incorporate it. "Rule 702 [ fail[ed] to incorporate a general
scientific acceptance standard, and the Advisory Committee Note
191 Note, supra note 90, at 842 (citing State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981)).
196 Comment, supra note 21, at 75. One additional approach listed a number of
factors to be considered within the structure of traditional relevancy and expert testimony
standards:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the existence and
maintenance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in
the characteristics of the technique, (4) analogy to other scientific tech-
niques whose results are admissible, (5) the extent to which the technique
has been accepted by scientists in the field involved, (6) the nature and
breadth of the inference adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity with which
the technique can be described and its results explained, (8) the extent to
which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, (9) the availability
of other experts to test and evaluate the technique, (10) the probative
significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case, and (11) the
care with which the technique was employed in the case. These factors
require examination of the characteristics of the evidence, the foundation
for the proffer, and the context of the proffer.
M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 911-12 (footnotes omitted).
I" See supra text accompanying note 108.
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[ I fail[ed] to even mention the Frye case.""19  Those who argue
that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not implicitly reject the
Frye test suggest that, since the Rules were not intended to serve
as a comprehensive codification of evidentiary rules, some stan-
dards are not addressed therein or are treated only in a general
manner. 199 "Therefore, it can be argued that because Frye was
the established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears
in the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remains
intact. ' ' 200 Those who suggest that the Frye test was rejected by
the Rules, however, look to the specific language of the Rules
to justify their arguments. 20 1 "Because scientific evidence could
be shown to be reliable and thus relevant under Rule 401m
without regard to its general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity, and because none of the exclusions enumerated in Rule
402201 is applicable, the Federal Rules have provided a standard
of admissibility inconsistent with Frye."2
Assuming that the Federal Rules of Evidence do reject the
Frye test, a balancing test must be applied in order to determine
whether a new scientific technique is admissible. 20 5 Under Rule
702, the judge first must make certain that the expert testimony
will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 206 The judge also must determine
"1 3 J. WEINsTEN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 702[03], at 702-36.
Rule 702 provides, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion otherwise." FED. R. Evm. 702.
I" Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1229 n.251 (noting that impeachment by evidence of
bias is not covered by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
2w Id.
201 Id. at 1230.
2D. R. Evm. 401 provides, "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. Evm. 401.
" FED. R. Evin. 402 provides, "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. Evin. 402.
2' Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1230.
Id. at 1235.
21 FED. R. Evm. 702, supra note 198. Several proposals have been made to amend
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whether the technique is relevant. 27 Next, in accordance with
Rule 403,20 the judge must weigh the probative value of the
evidence against "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, [the possibility of] misleading the jury, . . . consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." 20
IV. KENTUCKY
Kentucky courts have vacillated between following the Frye
test and rejecting it. In 1960, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that the results of a truth serum test were inadmissible
because such test had not "attained full scientific acceptance. ' 210
Subsequently, in 1964, the court of appeals held that the results
of a lie-detector test were inadmissible, in part because the test
needed "endorsement by a larger segment of the psychological
and physiological branches of science .... ,,1
However, in 1982, the Supreme Court of Kentucky implicitly
rejected the Frye standard in Brown v. Commonwealth.2 12 The
court, finding that expert testimony regarding a blood-testing
this Rule. See, e.g., Lederer, "Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach,"
115 F.R.D. 84 (1987) (adding the word "reliable" after the first word); Berger, A
Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 89 (1987) (adding an
additional sentence: "When the witness seeks to testify about a scientific principle or
technique that has not previously been accorded judicial recognition, the testimony shall
be admitted if the court determines that its probative value outweighs the dangers
specified in Rule 403."); Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92 (1987) (adding an
additional sentence: "In the case of expert testimony based upon a scientific theory or
technique, the court shall find that the theory or technique in question is scientifically
valid for the purposes for which it is tendered."); Giannelii, Scientific Evidence: A
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 102 (1987) (adding an additional
sentence: "Expert testimony is not admissible unless the proponent gives the adverse
party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence, including the
nature of the expected testimony, the tests used, and the qualifications of the person
who will testify.").
2w Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1235 ("[I]f the technique is not reliable, evidence
derived from the technique is not relevant."); see FED. R. Evm. 401, supra note 202.
FED. RULE Ev. 403.
See Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1239.
210 Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Ky. 1960).
211 Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Ky. 1964).
2.2 639 S.W.2d 758 (Ky. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
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method was admissible, cited McCormick's relevancy standard:
"Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified
expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons
for exclusion. ' 213 The court noted that "the only valid argu-
ment" against the eidence went to its credibility, not to its
admissibility.
214
The very next year, 1983, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
See-sawed back to the Frye test in Perry v. Commonwealth ex
rel. Kessinger.2 5 The Perry court cited the "general acceptance"
requirement of the Frye test and found that the evidence in
question, a blood test, had met that requirement. 21 6 In 1984, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky held polygraph evidence inadmis-
sible, but did not cite to the Frye test.
217
In Bussey v. Commonwealth,218 the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky reversed the trial court's admission of testimony concern-
ing the "sexual abuse accomodation syndrome," in part because
the record did not show any effort by the prosecution "to
establish the credibility of the . .. syndrome as a concept gen-
erally accepted in the medical community.1 21 9 No citation was
made to Frye. In 1986, the Supreme Court again was faced with
testimony regarding the sexual abuse accomodation syndrome. M
And again the Court noted the lack of "scientific acceptance or
credibility among clinical psychologists or psychiatrists."' 21 In
1987, the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Commonwealth v.
Rose22 allowed testimony concerning the battered wife syndrome
because "the witness provided background information suffi-
cient to demonstrate the scientific acceptability of the ... syn-
2 Id. at 760 (quoting C. McCoRMcK, supra note 16, § 203, at 491).
214 Id.
215 652 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1983).
216 Id. at 661.
2,1 Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Ky. 1984) ("This court has held
repeatedly and consistently that it does not yet consider such evidence scientific or
reliable."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 860 (1984).
218 697 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1985).
219 Id. at 141.
Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816.
22 Id. at 817.
725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 122 (1987).
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drome as a mental condition or entity generally recognized in
the medical community."
V. PROPOSAL
The Frye "general acceptance" test rests on the assumptions
that "jurors are in awe of scientific testimony and [therefore]
tend to overestimate its probative value'' 2 4 and that there is too
much error in forensic science.22 These underlying assumptions
have been sufficiently refuted,22 however, to warrant a rejection
of the Frye standard. Though some fear that an expert can be
paid to say anything, 227 a less conservative standard needs to be
used to allow the admissibility of relevant evidence that will aid
in the search for truth. With the addition of a few procedural
safeguards, the best standard is the traditional relevancy stan-
dard. 22 In other words, scientific evidence should be treated like
other evidence. The evidence must be relevant and, in accord
with Federal Rule of Evidence 403,229 not outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice or consumption of time, or misleading
the jury.230 Trial judges have the necessary tools with which to
deal with expert testimony relating to scientific evidence. The
judge can balance the probative worth of the expert testimony
against its prejudicial effect.2 1 Indeed, this balancing is within
the "broad discretion" of the trial judge. 232 Therefore, if the
expert testimony is too speculative or too prejudicial, the judge
has the ability to rule the evidence inadmissible. Also, in deter-
3 Id. at 590-91 ("We agree that, as a general proposition, evidence of this nature
is admissible after a proper foundation has been provided by evidence that this is a
mental condition constituting a recognized scientific entity and that the witness is
qualified to testify about it.").
2 Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1772.
225 Imwinkelried, supra note , at 560-64.
226 See id. at 564-71.
2 See Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1774 n.26 ("a Ph.D. can be
found to swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish")
(quoting Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 CoLum. L. Ray. 277, 333 (1985)).
2n See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
229 Fan. R. Evro. 403, supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
2" Giannelli, supra note 8, at 1204.




mining whether to admit expert testimony, the judge determines
whether the jury will be "appreciably help[ed]" by the testi-
mony.233 This provides the judge with another tool with which
he can refuse to admit expert testimony that is too speculative
or too prejudicial. If the testimony will not "appreciably help"
or, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,234 "assist" the trier of
fact, it can simply be excluded. Because of these tools in the
judge's hands, an additional requirement of "general accep-
tance" of novel scientific evidence is not necessary in order to
reach the truth in litigation. After all, "rejecting the Frye stan-
dard does not automatically signal abandonment of caution." 25
With today's liberal discovery rules and skilled attorneys,
the adversary process also can provide ample safeguards to
justify liberal admissibility standards for novel scientific evi-
dence. As one court said, "Unless an exaggerated popular opin-
ion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use
prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit
relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert
testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-exami-
nation and refutation.' '236
A few procedural safeguards could help the jury to better
handle novel scientific evidence. One safeguard that would aid
jurors in understanding their role when dealing with scientific
evidence is a proper limiting instruction. The jury should be told
that they may reject an expert witness' opinion regarding scien-
tific evidence if they find it unreliable. 237 Increased juror involve-
ment also can assist jurors in effective use of scientific evidence.
For example, jurors should be allowed to take notes, ask ques-
tions directly to experts, and read materials pertaining to the
evidence they will be confronted with at trial.28 Yet, with the
exceptiohs of these few changes, which serve to note the potential
233 Id.
2-4 Supra note 198.
23 M. McCormick, supra note 16, at 914.
236 United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975).
21 Such an instruction was used at the trial level in United States v. Williams, 583
F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). See id. at n.13 for
that instruction.
" See Note, The Frye Doctrine, supra note 8, at 1788-89.
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misleading character of scientific evidence, scientific evidence
should be accorded no special treatment.
CONCLUSION
In short, with the addition of a few safeguards, novel sci-
entific evidence should be treated the same as non-scientific
evidence. No doubt, judges who face issues of scientific evidence
properly should understand and note that they are dealing with
potentially misleading evidence; but, they should proceed with a
normal relevancy and expert testimony analysis. In that analysis,
judges will have an opportunity to determine whether expert
testimony will assist the trier of fact and to weigh the probative
value of the scientific evidence against the potential for mislead-
ing the jury, confusing the issues, or creating unfair prejudice,
By recognizing that they are dealing with potentially misleading
evidence, that factor can be properly balanced in the traditional
relevancy manner-the manner that has, as of now, proven to
be the best way of arriving at the truth.
John D. Borders, Jr.*
* An appreciation of this topic would have been unattainable without the aca-
demic guidance of Professor Robert"G. Lawson.
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